Guest Contributor:

One tip for politicians in places of power – don’t mention the “C” word when u are facing a tricky economic situation.

It reminds me of President Sezer in Turkey in 2001 when he famously (reportedly, but maybe urban legend) threw a copy of the constitution at then PM Ecevit and said “we have a crisis”. Within days the market had taken him at his word, and the crawling peg exchange rate regime had collapsed and the rest is history.


published 4 February 2016: Economics, EU, Reform


Guest Contributor:

By Kirk Bennett

A recent flare-up notwithstanding, a stable ceasefire seems to be taking hold in the Donbas. Recognizing that a Russian knock-out blow in Ukraine is currently not in the cards, and stung to action by the steady weakening of the Assad regime in the Syrian war of attrition, Moscow has palpably cycled down its pressure, both military and political, on Kyiv. The Kremlin has billed its intervention in Syria as a Russian contribution to a joint struggle of the civilized world against ISIS, and has at the same time taken pains to be seen as playing a helpful role in the Donbas, demonstratively reining in indigenous hard-liners (occasionally with extreme prejudice) and pushing to postpone local elections viewed by Kyiv as illegal and by the West as provocative. Accordingly, there has been an uptick in calls to reward Russia for its constructive behavior by relaxing or removing Western sanctions at the earliest opportunity.

Not long ago I wrote that, by a quirk of geopolitics, ISIS had become a de facto ally of Ukraine. I stand corrected. Ukraine’s real ally in Syria is none other than Bashar Assad. It is Russian alarm at the prospect of the Assad regime’s collapse – not the need to forge some grand coalition against ISIS – that has of necessity deflected the Kremlin’s attention from the grim, long-term struggle to undermine Ukrainian statehood. How things came to such a pass ought to be a cautionary tale for everyone, and above all for the Kremlin.


published 30 November 2015: Democracy, EU, Europe, History, Military, NATO, Russia

Letter to Congress on ongoing crisis in Ukraine

Guest Contributor:

October 29, 2015

The Honorable Thad Cochran
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C., 20510

continue reading Letter to Congress on ongoing crisis in Ukraine →

published 30 October 2015: Democracy, Economics, EU, Europe, NATO, Reform, Russia, Security

European Regional Security Damaged: Back to Realpolitik?

Guest Contributor:

Mykola Kapitonenko

Along with possible future implications, which are so actively speculated about, Russia’s active revisionist policy in Europe and beyond is generating a new reality on the ground in real-time mode. It turns out not so much that President Putin has lost touch with reality, but rather that his vision and perception of reality is being actively imposed on Europe’s political agenda. Politics is not only about material factors, but also ideas and perceptions. The ability to shape agenda and reframe values is an important power asset and the way this asset is being currently used by Putin undermines European security.

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published 27 October 2015: Democracy, EU, History, Military, NATO, Russia, Security

The Minsk Trap

Guest Contributor:

Kirk Bennett

The Ukrainian parliamentary debate on constitutional reform to promote decentralization has occurred under enormous pressure from the West for Kyiv to uphold its end of the Minsk Agreements, negotiated in September 2014 and February 2015 to secure a ceasefire in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The fatal clashes outside the Ukrainian Rada on August 31, as well as the alarming fissures appearing in the ruling coalition, underscore the extreme fragility of the Ukrainian domestic situation, which ought to prompt a serious reexamination of the Western approach to the peace process in Ukraine.

This reassessment should begin with a sober recognition of the glaring shortcomings of the Minsk Agreements. First and foremost, they have not really ended the fighting. While neither side has fully upheld the ceasefire, the most blatant violations have clearly been on the Russian side, which launched offensives to seize the Donetsk Airport in September and the town of Debaltseve in February before the ink was even dry on the two agreements. These land grabs were not merely conducted with total impunity; worse still, the Kremlin was allowed to impose even more disadvantageous terms on Kyiv in Minsk II than in Minsk I. The rewarding of Moscow for violating the ceasefire has created a horrendous precedent that can only encourage further Russian depredations.

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published 14 September 2015: Democracy, EU, Europe, History, NATO, Reform, Russia